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ABSTRACT.  Just as Michael Porter’s “five forces”
provided a practical analytical tool for describing the
forces that shape competitive strategy, so business
ethicists ought to provide business leaders with a
workable framework for understanding the sources
of ethical obligations. The forces that shape compet-
itive strategy vary according to time and industry, but
are anchored in an ultimate criteria of profitability.
Similarily, ethics can use a set of analytical categories
that identify the relevant forces to business ethics on
the basis of relationality.
This paper first argues that relationality based on
naturalism is the primary, plausible value for ethics.
Second, it adapts a tripartite dialectic from scholars
William Frederick and Michael Novak to describe the
relational categories with which business must
contend. Third, it uses these forces in a way similar
to Porter’s competitive forces to offer an analytical
language familiar to managers in order to characterize
business ethics.
An important challenge for academics working
in the field of business ethics is to find a way to
translate philosophical questions into generally
accessible languages and practical methodologies.
Businesspersons typically are not trained in
philosophy, nor are they necessarily interested in
questions framed in philosophical terms. Even
academics working in other business-related fields
such as law, marketing, and organizational
behavior may not find philosophical discussions
useful. Both groups can, however, be very inter-
ested in the ethical questions that arise in
business. For this reason, it is important to ask
which “languages” best translate the insights of
formal business ethics into helpful analytical
categories.
By taking on this question here, I am not
attempting to provide particular directives for
ethical decision making. That is, I am not
claiming a set of universal commandments for
business nor am I presenting the proper priori-
tization of decision-making principles. Instead,
for purposes of this paper, I am pursuing a
process that simply tries to find a set of
metaphors accessible to businesspersons that
describe how they should act. Law is one such
language. Like philosophical ethics, law attempts
to formulate principles that encourage or dis-
courage behavior and to apply those principles
to particular cases. Applied outside of legal
structures, law becomes embodied as ethical rules
often found in corporate policies. Such rule-
based principles, however, often undermine
freedom of moral thought and personal respon-
sibility in favor of minimalist notions of how to
stay out of trouble. 
Given surveys that indicate the importance of
religious belief to many Americans, including
businesspersons (McMahon, 1989, Arlow and
Ulrich, 1988) a similar translation process can
take place by linking moral beliefs to religious
traditions. Linking ethics to religious traditions
can lead people to follow specific command-
ments, demonstrate loyalty to a particular moral
community, or to fulfill individual spiritual
obligations and quests. Psychology would be a
secular candidate for this translation process,
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particularly in its business manifestation as
organizational behavior. The sectarian, relative,
and/or often individualistic nature of these
approaches makes it hard to determine, however,
if there are cross-cultural moral obligations.
These languages are not identical to the
language of philosophy. Philosophy questions
how a person should live. Law, religion and
psychology do not solely study the way a person
should live. Nevertheless, they each have a great
deal to do with the question. For many people,
they also frame the question itself. 
For the purposes of this paper, I sketch an
analytical structure consisting of a tripartite
dialectic that is rooted in sociology, theology, and
naturalist philosophy. Justifying the philosophical,
theological, and sociological dimensions of
the structure is a complex task that is beyond
the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, for the
tripartite dialectic to be credible, the episte-
mology of the position must at least be plausible.
Part One of this paper therefore explains why my
approach, which I call the Naturalist/Relational
Theory (NRT), is plausible. Part Two then
describes how NRT can be translated into
analytical categories that can help nonspecialists
address questions of business ethics. Part Three
ties this analytical structure to contemporary
management methodologies in hopes of
demonstrating how NRT can be a practical way
of analyzing moral problems.
I.  The plausibility of the naturalist/
I. relational theory
A. Self-Evident reality
In a pluralistic country and a shrinking world,
the diversity of moral beliefs makes it difficult for
any truths to seem self-evident or universal. Yet
universal and self-evident truths are central to any
naturalist theory. Classical natural law theory
focuses on the universal and more contemporary
naturalism on the self-evident. Viewed in terms
of the Kantian emphasis on individual moral
decision-making, however, our present culture
threatens to make a mockery of the attempt to
identify these kinds of truths. Moreover, because
ethical inquiry involves particular, idiosyncratic
problems not easily described by any compre-
hensive moral theory, a naturalist perspective can
seem doomed to failure. 
In a sense, naturalism simply builds upon the
obvious. After-dinner speakers have for years told
the story of the couple lost, airborne, in an hot-
air balloon. Spotting someone on the ground
(usually a lawyer, but professors have sometimes
make an appearance as well), the meandering
balloonist calls out, “Can you tell me where I
am?” The ground-based spectator replies, “in the
air, riding in a hot-air balloon.” The balloonist
remarks to his companion, “Undoubtedly a
lawyer (or professor, etc.). Entirely accurate and
completely useless.”
Naturalism is sometimes like the ground-based
spectator: Accurate without being helpful. For
example, naturalism deems moral knowledge a
quest for how to flourish and to live well. It
also presents human beings as essentially social
creatures (Perry, 1990).
With each proposition, naturalism says nothing
about what is necessary to flourish, or how
human beings best express their socialness, their
“relationality.” But the usefulness of naturalism’s
propositions is in their recognition of how
human beings are part of a larger context that
includes other people, the community
(MacIntyre, 1981; Hauerwas, 1983; Solomon,
1993) and nature itself (Frederick, 1992 and
1995) 
Nearly every “school” of business ethics
recognizes, in one way or another, the relation-
ality of humanity and our quest to flourish. The
virtue-based theory of Robert Solomon takes
this approach most clearly because of his
emphasis on the communities necessary to teach
virtue and the understanding that whatever
actions we take contribute to the moral devel-
opment of those who observe and are affected by
others actions. The very notion of stakeholders
(Freeman, 1994; Boatright, 1994), is a recogni-
tion of the impact of corporate action on
nonshareholders. Thus, stakeholder theorys
insights take into account the very real conse-
quences of corporate action on all of a corpora-
tions constituents. Similarly, rights-based theory
(Werhanel, 1985) specifies what kinds of rights
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are beyond corporate, utilitarian calculus in order
to minimize the harmful effects of corporate
action on various constituents. Finally, the notion
of a social contract (Donaldson and Dunfee,
1994) assumes the existence and legitimacy of a
relationship in which people in various corpo-
rate and noncorporate roles must negotiate
(actually or hypothetically) with one another
their mutual obligations. Each of the business
ethics theories have a common essential relational
component. 
There are, of course, many ways in which
business behavior is relational. Plant closings
impact employees and their communities, as do
harassment and discriminatory practices. Nature
itself is negatively affected by pollution, oil spills,
and depletion of its resources. Moreover, con-
temporary quantum physics demonstrates that
not only human beings, but all entities – even
the smallest molecular components – exist only
in a relational dance of energy, matter, and time
(Harris, 1992; Davies, 1983, and Wheatley,
1992). Thus, it is not simply corporate actions
are relational, but the very structure of life itself
is relational. No action is without its conse-
quences on the well-being of others. Without
specifying what the best kinds of relationships
may be then, a relational theory points out the
obvious, but vital truth that our very human
existence is relational. No action can be com-
partmentalized. No action, except perhaps pure
contemplation, is purely private.
William Frederick has argued that the moral
issues of business arise out of gene-based evolu-
tionary processes and therefore, business values
can be grounded in nature itself (Frederick, 1992
and 1995). Fredericks analysis, which is very
important to the next part of this paper, makes
the important – and self-evident – point that
human beings are, by nature, relational so that
attempts to compartmentalize human behavior
should be suspect. Denying that one’s actions
have consequences, and often significant conse-
quences for others, both human and nonhuman,
or that such consequences need to be accounted
for, contradicts the reality of our existence and
claims to the contrary ought to be viewed
suspiciously. 
Pointing out our relationality is not useless, but
an accurate, self-evident statement that must be
a central feature of any subsequent determination
of ethical obligations. If one is to argue, however,
that it is plausible to use naturalism to make
moral claims, one must address the is-ought
dilemma of the so-called !naturalist fallacy. That
is, the descriptive fact that we are related does
not necessarily mean that our actions ought to
enhance our relationality.
B. The naturalist fallacy and relational theory
For some, the idea that all human beings, and
indeed nature itself, are relational implies that
each persons ethical duty becomes “A spiritual
community of persons, mutually responsible for
the welfare of all and for the material basis on
which that depends” (Harris, 1987, pp. 262–263).
Because of our interconnectedness, a negative
consequence for another person is a negative
consequence for me as well. Thus, philosopher
Errol Harris argues that such interconnected rela-
tionality becomes a “universal principle” of
increasing consciousness, self-sufficiency, and self-
determination so that:
If we have been right so far, it should follow that
the highest from (sic) hitherto experienced, human
mentality, is the closest analogy to the ultimate
nature of the absolute whole. In that case, it must
involve something like, yet somehow transcending,
self-conscious personality. It must involve and yet
transcend some form of organized community. It
must be at once a physical, organic, intelligent,
moral and spiritual whole, of which we (with all
that is implied in our nature) are integral members.
(Harris, 1987, p. 262)
Harris claims that one can derive a normative
model from nature – and thereby defeat the
naturalist fallacy – because the evolutionary
progression from simple to complex organisms,
currently culminating in self-reflective con-
sciousness, is both the source of moral con-
sciousness and the recognition of the duty to act
in ways that embrace our interrelatedness. That
is, it is our evolutionary destiny to become
increasingly aware of the consequences of our
actions, so that we enhance our humanness and
How Relationality Shapes Business and Its Ethics 1383
goodness by taking increasing responsibility for
the consequences of our actions.
Does Harris successfully defeat the naturalist
fallacy? It is not clear that he does, since he does
not clarify why an individual ought to embrace
the holistic formulation Harris recommends or
how all people are negatively affected by one
anothers losses. If I win a game, contract, or a
promotion and you lose, how am I hurt? One
can argue, for instance, that there is a human
ability to transcend nature or that the evolu-
tionary process can allow beings to act with more
self-interest than Harris model. Harris himself
to some extent recognizes the lack of proof of
relational duty when he concludes that, in con-
ceiving of the self-conscious, personal, and
interpersonal nature of ultimate reality, one
essentially takes a leap of faith:
The answer, of course, is implicitly given in
religion, which postulates a supreme being of the
kind required. But that is not a complete or distinct
answer, because the question remains – how we are
to conceive the Deity (Harris, 1992, pp. 34–35).
Harris’s use of religion leads to an under-
standing of God in Tillich-like terms: unfolding,
ultimate self-conscious awareness and intercon-
nection. In such an understanding, God is not a
grand person meting out justice and mercy, but
an evolutionary, spiritual force perfecting itself
through time. There very well may be good
reasons for encouraging religious belief so that
individuals act for the welfare of others, but the
appeal to faith in a divine being does not itself
compel a claim that our natural condition of
relationality requires us to act in ways that
embrace it. 
A second response to the naturalist fallacy
problem comes from the legal philosopher
Michael Perry. Perry essentially follows
Wittgenstein in rejecting the search for princi-
ples that ultimately justify moral behavior in favor
of an “existential orientation” in which we
participate in life (Perry, 1990). That is, we create
our moral principles by the ways in which we
act rather than through some pre-existing, self-
standing justification.
Perry argues that one cannot ultimately justify
values like rationality and flourishing. The
“proof ” is ultimately circular; it depends upon
the authority of that which is being proved.
Unless one already values rationality, for instance,
we cannot justify it. But, he argues, we do value
rationality and flourishing and it is because of our
existential orientation toward these values that
they become criteria for moral action. In fact,
we may actually be better able to prove that
human beings are relational than that they are
rational or that they seek to flourish. But even
if we can prove that human beings are relational
creatures, the moral duty to embrace those
actions that foster relationality derives not from
the normative position that we ought to do
things that foster relationships because of its
goodness, but instead from our orientation
toward relationality.
Perry concludes that the truly important
question is not whether a person ought to be
moral, an ultimately circular question. The
question is whether there is a connection
between what Perry calls altruism and a flour-
ishing life. As a result, Perry, like Harris, ques-
tions whether a secular philosophy can sustain
that connection or whether a claim of self-
fulfillment through what is essentially a duty to
“love thy neighbor” requires religious belief. I
agree with both Harris and Perry of the ultimate
necessity of religious belief to make this claim.
For purposes of this discussion, however, it is
sufficient to claim that Perry does overcome the
naturalist fallacy by refusing to require normative
claims to stand on non-naturalist grounds. In
short, his claim is that the naturalist fallacy exists
when one requires moral knowledge to be based
on justificatory claims. If such an epistemology
is not the basis for such claims, then it is plau-
sible that our relational nature and valuing of
relationality, as well as rationality, flourishing,
survival and profit, make relationality itself an
appropriate moral claim.
C. Translating the conclusion
What does the plausibility of NRT mean in the
business context? Can one make any particular
claims about business behavior on the basis of a
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naturalist understanding of our relationality? I
believe there are two answers.
First, recognizing our relational nature does in
fact challenge claims that “business is business.”
It prevents one’s routine compartmentalizing
business behavior as unconstrained by relational
forces. Businesspersons, in fact, readily under-
stand the importance of relationality in terms of
competition and long-term relationships with
constituents including suppliers, employees, and
consumers. The determinative issue is the
priority and nature of particular relationships. To
whom does business owe its primary responsi-
bility and in what ways? This question leads to
my second response that asks further what the
observation of nature tells us about relationality.
I am not asking simply whether or not we
should model our behavior after that which we
observe in nature. Nature provides many such
models. Rather, I seek to identify the common
forces in nature that affect behavior. The work
of William Frederick suggests that these forces
operate in a tripartite dialectic. Moreover, the
dialectic has sociological analogues that provide
a framework with which executives can analyze
moral problems in business.
II.  The tripartite dialectic
A. Description
1. The naturalist basis of the dialectic. William
Frederick has argued that there are three value
clusters that oppose one another: economizing
values, power aggrandizing values, and ecolo-
gizing values. All three values are rooted in
nature and are “incompatible with each other.”
Frederick recognizes that culture also plays an
important role in shaping values, but one that is
“an outgrowth and extrusion of dynamic natural
forces that embrace, in the most literal and
comprehensive manner, the innermost recesses of
our being and the farthest realms of the cosmos.”
He also recognizes “x-factor values,” the totality
of individually held values within an organiza-
tion. Because individually held values differ,
organizations’ “value-boxes” (their culture) can
differ widely.
In spite of these cultural variations, Fredericks
tripartite value structure provides a defensible
representation of the recurring forces in business.
Economizing values combat entropic disintegra-
tion, disorder, and degradation according to
Frederick. Thus, for Frederick, the central
significance of business is its ability to sustain life
for those falling under its “organizational
umbrella.” Business makes its primary contribu-
tion by promoting economizing. It must balance
inputs and outputs, foster growth, and maintain
systemic integrity.
Economizing is therefore the central, indispensable,
defining characteristic of business. It emerges as the
main normative principle of business activity.
Businesss social justification rests on this econo-
mizing principle, which is its central value
(Frederick, 1992, p. 290).
In addition to economizing, however, other
natural forces operate in business. Chief among
them is power aggrandizement. One’s position in
a firm’s hierarchy and the power derived from it
in that hierarchy become a “dominant value of
the business order.” Frederick argues that the
“addictive hedonism of power is the defining trait
of corporate managerial culture and personality.”
Frederick classifies the final set of values as
ecologizing values that do not function in
business. “Interconnectedness knits a community
of life forms together with themselves and with
the environment of their ecosystems.” Like the
other values, ecologizing values grow out of the
evolutionary processes of natural selection, where
such interconnectedness has “adaptive survival
effects.” These values include symbiosis, collab-
oration, and mutual life-support (a more com-
prehensive interlinkage phenomena than
symbiosis), group defense and integrity, and,
resulting from these three, community sustenance
equilibrium. Frederick argues these values
directly oppose those of economizing and power
aggrandizement.
Ecologizing proceeds by collaboration and coop-
eration, whereas both economizing and power
aggrandizement are most  successfully achieved by
competition and self-centeredness. Ecologizing
promotes the survival of integrated groups of living
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things within their respective ecosystems.
Economizing and power aggrandizement pit
groups against one another in a vast and destruc-
tive zero-sum game. It is out of these differences
that the most important normative issues in
business arise to confront us. (Frederick, 1992, p.
296).
Frederick concludes that a central mistake of
business ethicists is to focus on the points at
which the two central thrusts of business, econ-
omizing and power aggrandizement, conflict
with individual x-factors. This homocentric
emphasis on individual persons misses the central
challenge to business behavior: the ecologizing
demands of nature. That is, the question for
business ethics is not so much when an individual
is abused by economic and political self-cen-
teredness, but rather how to enhance relation-
ality in daily life. His position, like that of Perry’s,
suggests that one must make the connection
between altruistic behavior and a flourishing life.
The question is whether Fredericks descrip-
tion is plausible. I conclude, with one important
caveat, that it largely is. The caveat is that instead
of viewing natural forces as being opposed, they
are dialectical. The value clusters themselves are
interrelated, as a sociological description of the
tripartite dialectic makes evident.
2. The sociological basis of the dialectic. The notion
of a tripartite dialectic consisting of the
economic, political, and cultural/moral sectors
has been most prominently championed by
Michael Novak. Unlike the sociologist from
whom Novak appropriated the dialectic – Daniel
Bell, who claimed that capitalism undermines the
interdependency of the three sectors – Novak
claims that, linked with a set of whiggish values,
capitalism in fact supports it. These whigish
values include individual self-discipline, civic
responsibility, competitiveness, creativity, and
cooperation. Rather than analyzing capitalism
solely as an economic phenomena, Novak argues
that it has to be contextualized within politics
and culture (Dorrien, 1993). The difference is
important because it suggests that rather than
making values such as cooperation and commu-
nity sustenance antipodal to economizing and
power aggrandizement, Novak places them in a
dialectical relationship. It may be true, for
instance, that individuals seek power and status,
but to do so requires collaborative effort.
Similarly, an organization’s limitation on disorder
and promotion of growth is interdependent with
its ability to collaborate with others. This dialec-
tical identification does not serve to ennoble
economizing and power aggrandizement, but it
does suggest that the relationship among
Frederick’s value clusters is not as opposed as he
describes.
An example of the essential interrelationship
of these forces can be found in the work of free
market theorist F.A. Hayek. He roots his theory
in an evolutionary epistemology with consider-
able room for moral virtues. For Hayek, the basis
of morality is trade, for it is when exchange is
desired that human beings learn virtues such as
promise-keeping, truth-telling, quality produc-
tion of traded material, and even notions of
altruism and solidarity (albeit far more limited
than what most ethicists propose) (Hayek, 1988).
These virtues are necessary for trade to flourish.
That they do flourish helps humanity to survive,
providing the existential justification for morality
on a level without normative claims. Further, life
is too complex and human beings too cognitively
limited to permit a “fatal conceit” of specifying
a complete set of laws which restrain economic
behavior by enacting morality. Rather, laws
ought to protect certain basic rights such as life,
freedom of contract, and property according to
Hayek. Beyond these restraints, moral institutions
such as the family and the church, according to
the agnostic Hayek, ought to instill the requisite
virtues in order for trade to flourish. Thus, even
in this rather uninspiring framework, business
virtues are necessary in addition to legal con-
straints for the survival of business. Without such
a balance, Hayek argues, instinctual self-gratifi-
cation undermines economic affairs.
One may wish to dispute whether economics
completely explains moral behavior. But under-
lying Hayek’s analysis is a recognition of the
necessity of relationality. One does learn about
moral behavior by interacting with others and by
learning from the experience and reflections of
those, including ones self, who have interacted
with others. Novak argues that personal quests
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to make society better through the establishment
of voluntary organizations can provide social
justice without the government imposition
Hayek fears. Such a notion allows individuals to
enact the form of solidarity appropriate for their
particular community. By actively building up the
cultural/moral sector, they promote ecologizing,
community values. Those notions of solidarity,
however, are not extraneous to business; they are
the cooperative glue that allow people to live
with one another. They provide the ecologizing
context within which economics and politics
operate, a fact that Toqueville recognized in
American society long ago. Thus, the tripartite
structure, nuanced dialectically, provides a way to
take into account basic forces that shape business
behavior.
Pope John Paul II drew on Novak’s dialectic
in his encyclical Centesimus Annus (1991). He
demanded an economic structure in which
participating individuals would be motivated to
practice solidarity. The Pope clearly had in mind
specific forms of solidarity practiced through the
dignified treatment of workers, the inclusion of
the poor in the free market economy, and a
particular level of freedom. Whether or not these
definitions of solidarity are appropriate does not
necessarily determine the way in which the
moral sector ought to limit the economic and
political power. The “common good” is this
dialectic is a communal manifestation of rela-
tionality rather than a specific institutional or
cultural form.
Frederick is correct that since businesss social
justification is its economizing role, profitability
is the primary value for business. Given the fact
that those affected by business have other primary
values, however, business reaches its value of
profitability by interaction with various “x-
factors” and with other sectors. Goodwill and
reputation have economic importance because
ecologizing values matter to business.
B. Levels of the dialectic
On the largest scale, the dialectic simply recog-
nizes the various sectors of life in a free society.
As indicated in Figure 1, the tripartite dialectic
not only describes a businesss interface with those
outside of its organizational confines, but also its
relationships with those inside. Efficiency is a
dominant economizing value in an organization.
So are internal hierarchy, policy structures, and
employee morale. Even Sun Tzu’s classic The Art
of War (1991), a book in which one would not
expect to find a discussion of morality, begins
with a discussion of the importance of a generals
building harmony with soldiers by treating them
with benevolence. 
The values of economizing, power aggran-
dizement, and ecologizing are interdependent.
By focusing too heavily on efficiency, an
organization can undermine internal harmony,
which in turn can undermine the entire purpose
of the organization. Similarly, internal fiefdoms
undermine harmony and efficiency. To fulfill its
own role, each value cluster must act within the
constraints imposed by the other sectors. Taking
other sectors’ interests into account does not
make an organization surrender to those other
sectors, but it will prevent the compartmental-
ization of any one of Fredericks forces. The
dialectic is thus applicable within a given orga-
nization as well.
For example, over the past decade or so,
How Relationality Shapes Business and Its Ethics 1387
Fig. 1.  Circle of relationality, the tri-partite dialectic
the dialectic of business ethics.
American businesses have imported the originally
American-grown theories of total quality.
(Deming, 1982; Juran, 1979) These theories,
emphasizing employee empowerment controlled
by sophisticated statistical processes, have demon-
strated that competitive business practices are
fostered by collaborative workplaces and stream-
lined hierarchies. These management practices
indicate that in many instances, good ecologizing
is good economizing.
I do not wish to suggest that business enter-
prise is a paragon of ecologizing values.
Particularly within a global context, business is
not likely to constrain its behavior unless required
to do so. Moreover, it may well be true that if
business leaders could get away with not
considering ecologizing values, they would, con-
tenting themselves with power aggrandizement
and economizing. But the insight of the free
market, espoused particularly well by Hayek,
is that the market itself requires restraint of
instinctual self-gratification in order for more
complex interdependent relationships and trading
opportunities to develop. Even if one eschews
the goodness of business ethics, business requires
them if is to sustain itself.
Given Fredericks claim that the three value
clusters reach to the ends of the cosmos, it should
not be surprising that these values occur within
individuals as well. Many issues of moral integrity
in business are directly related to this interaction.
For example, do feelings of loyalty to a co-
worker/friend take precedence over a change for
one’s own promotion or prevent one from
reporting that friend for embezzlement? Does the
need to feed oneself or the desire to reach a
position of power outweigh working on a
morally offensive product? These dispositions,
in fact, are Frederick’s x-factors, and just as a
particular organization or a particular culture
have different ways of prioritizing and expressing
those values, so do individuals. These examples
demonstrate economizing values related to basic
survival needs, power aggrandizing values of
ambition, and ecologizing values of conscience.
Thus, one can analyze moral problems in business
within this tripartite dialectic from the standpoint
of political economies, organizational culture, or
individual morality.
Analyzing business ethics in terms of these
dialectically interdependent value clusters does
not solve particular moral problems, but the
tripartite dialectic does provide a framework with
which one can analyze the various forces
impacting business. The next question is the
practicability of this approach. I will argue that
the approach is practicable for a business execu-
tive because describing ethical dilemmas in terms
of interdependent relational forces places ethics
within a familiar managerial decision-making
process.
III. Managerial application of the dialectic
To this point, I have explained how NRT is
plausible and how a tripartite dialectic of natural
and sociological forces helps to analyze the
various dimensions of business. How though,
does an executive decide what to do? To answer
this question, I draw on managerial theory,
because that theory is likely to be familiar to
executives. Managerial theory requires executives
to take into account the dialectical nature of the
three forces. Without trying to make business-
persons into philosopher-kings, it does require
them to resist compartmentalized thinking and
to account for how forces impact others. 
A. Corporate strategy and accounting for social forces
A popular method of teaching corporate strategy
is Michael Porter’s classic “Five Forces Theory”
(Porter, 1975). Under Porter’s theory, a manager
must analyze the competitive position of a
company by identifying and, if possible, manip-
ulating the forces in order to create a sustainable
competitive advantage. These forces are the threat
of new entrants, the bargaining power of
customers, the bargaining power of suppliers, the
threat of substitute products or services, and the
rivalry among existing firms within the industry.
Determining what an executive must do to create
a strategy before a problem is analyzed would be
foolish. It is through the analytical process that
one determines how a firm should be positioned
in order to sustain a competitive advantage and
the resulting profitability.
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In Porter’s Five Forces Theory, one must
scrutinize the industry in which one operates.
The particular industry and the particular
company will give rise to a specific set of issues
with which the executive must deal. For instance,
the principal problem for a company may be
defense of its market position where there are
strong buyers and weak suppliers. If there is no
strong rivalry among firms in the industry, that
force is not as relevant as are other forces, if it is
relevant at all.
Similarly an executive’s particular ethical issue
may have nothing to do with the legality of a
proposed action. Any proposed reasonable alter-
native may be legal. Instead, the question for the
executive may be establishing a more efficient
workforce by firing many workers. Another
alternative could be to invite the workers to assist
management in solving the problem. While there
could be negative implications for company
goodwill when it fires employees, there could
also be greater profit. These counterbalancing
forces would not be as important as determining
how to become more efficient while still
maintaining ecologizing, community-sustaining
values. In light of these natural, recurring forces,
an executive cannot simply ignore one force to
address the other any more than the executive
can ignore any relevant competitors when
crafting corporate strategy.
Similarly, one cannot articulate an a priori
determination of what ethical responsibilities a
business person may have until the dimensions of
the issue are understood. Porter’s framework for
analyzing competitive strategy does frame a
business problem in a way similar to the tripar-
tite dialectic. As such, a primary duty for a
manger would be to identify the nature of the
problem and then balance the forces to enhance
relationality.
To a great degree, this strategy is simply one
of stakeholder theory and of social contract
theory. That is, the responsibility of an execu-
tive is to take into account the natural forces that
are a part of business. But given the difficulty
in negotiating with various constituents, the
dialectical approach of NRT puts the executive
in the position of analyzing the inherent forces
that are part of business itself. The businessperson
need not become responsible for all problems of
society, but rather of all the factors that are
part of the business. If the forces are, in fact,
dialectical, then business must consider ecolo-
gizing forces in order to enhance its economic
prospects.
B. Managerial balancing of dialectical forces
What does a business leader then do when con-
fronted with an ethical problem? The executive
takes into account all the forces that are a natural
part of human life, including relationality. The
executive considers legal, economic, and ecolo-
gizing values. As indicated in Figure 2, an
executive has as many as nine “angles” to
consider when the tripartite dialectic is cubed on
the three levels of social, organizational, and
individual.
Since each sector operates at three levels, one
can use the structure to determine what kind of
issue is involved. The issue could be purely
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Fig. 2.  The tri-partite dialectic, the dialectic of
business ethics.
personal, organizational, or social (conceived of
in more macro terms). Is the dilemma a social,
philanthropic one or is it one related to the
efficient use of internal resources? The former
calls into question what role a corporation has
in relation to society as a whole, while the latter
is more concerned with how that role is accom-
plished within the organization. In both cases,
there is a moral element to the decision. This
tripartite structure does not mandate a particular
action, but an executive should take into account
the consequences of the decision on these various
elements for the very reason that corporate action
cannot be compartmentalized.
For instance, a religious fundamentalist insur-
ance claim adjuster may be morally repulsed by
approving a claim for abortion services. The
business transaction would be legal and profitable,
but conscience may require the adjuster to refuse
to perform the job and/or quit. The decision to
take such an action could also be affected by
the individual’s economic position (would the
adjuster’s family starve by this action) and perhaps
a commitment to defer to authority. In this case,
the three value clusters operate on an individual
level and might be addressed at that level.
An important implication of this model is the
necessity of creating organizational structures in
which personal virtues can be drawn upon
in making business decisions. Without such a
structure, business organizations tend to become
two rather than three dimensional. That is, all
business matters tend to become evaluated solely
in terms of economics or legalities. In such
instances, Frederick is correct in noting that
ecologizing values play little if any part in
business. Such instances also lead to the tug-of-
war critiqued by free-marketers such as Hayek in
which excessive legal interference undermines
the economic and moral power of the market.
It is when personal virtues become relevant in
business; where one’s personal commitment,
energy, and identity are engaged by the business
that ecologizing values dialectically support
business enterprise and where executives can then
balance natural forces as they do strategic ones.
The decision an executive makes, then, results
from the identification of the nature of the issue
and the analysis of the particular problem at hand,
just as an executive must balance competitive
forces in order to determine corporate action. I
explicitly leave open the issue of prioritizing
proper behavior within each module to the
normative, empirical, and historical studies that
demonstrate what value particular ecologizing
virtues have. This paper is not meant to mandate
a particular solution for particular dilemmas any
more than Porter’s theory mandates a fail-safe
corporate strategy. I do think this schema of
analyzing corporate moral problems can lead to
a more complete decision-making methodology.
It requires an executive to consider the commu-
nity-building values of business because those
values are part of our human nature and because
it is part of the essential nature of business.
IV.  Conclusion
This paper argues that the Naturalist/Relational
Theory is a plausible description of life. Because
we value relationality, our socialness, we need
ecologizing values of community in order to
flourish.
Ecologizing values operate within a tripartite
dialectical context, along with economizing and
power aggrandizing values. All three value
clusters have a basis in nature and have socio-
logical expression as well. What business ethics
ought to concern itself with are the ways in
which the community-building, ecologizing
values balance the more readily apparent values
of economizing and power aggrandizement
within the corporation.
The tripartite dialectic describes a way for
executives to understand these forces, not as
mandated ethical principles, but as forces that
must be accounted for in making business
decisions. Taking these forces into account
replicates a managerial methodology present in
corporate strategy. Thus, by viewing ethics as sets
of relationships that must be taken into account
by business executives, one provides a flexible,
yet defined means of determining how various
persons and groups will be affected by corpo-
rate action and how their reactions will impact
the ultimate economizing success of the business
enterprise.
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